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SHAPING A SECURE FUTURE-AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. The development and maintenance of amicable U.S.-China relationships in the next five to ten years is critical to U.S. national security and reveal significant implications to U.S. national military strategy. The predominant strategic view expressed by defense planners and other
Bush administration strategists is that China may be our next near-peer military confrontation. operations confirm that the conduct of war has changed. September 11 also ushered in the idealist view that most of the world is so economically interdependent that the days of "great power" wars are over. 3 China is on the rise to great power status with among other changes, projections of significant defense spending. With China as a strategic partner rather than as a strategic competitor, the U.S. can appropriately shape its own defense structure and organize, train, and equip a force capable of dealing with the security threats of the 21 st century without engaging in an arms race. This paper will analyze two critical areas and present alternate policy options to avoid unnecessary military confrontation with China. The two areas are the Peoples Republic of China's historical sovereignty perspective in regards to Taiwan and its military modernization initiatives.
The Taiwan Issue
Currently, the Republic of China on Taiwan is pushing its independence agenda, while the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) stands firm that Taiwan will remain a part of China-at all costs. 4 The United States remains a staunch supporter for Taiwan. To understand the implications and potential peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, one must explore its genesis and understand both U.S. and China's interests in Taiwan The U.S.-China relationship began with no inter-governmental cooperation agreements, but has grown to include more than thirty. 6 It is worth recalling the antagonistic relationship between China and the United States, then rivaled only by that between the U.S. and the Soviet China, and that resolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal affair "in which no other country has the right to interfere." 11 Second, the United States acknowledged that there was "but one
China" with Taiwan being part of China and all Chinese people on both sides of the strait recognized this fact. 12 Third, both U.S. and PRC leaders concluded normalization between their countries was in the best interests of their respective peoples, the region, and the world. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." 14 The final communiqué dated August 17, 1982, reiterated the commitments of the first two with joint emphasis on peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. However, the most significant element of this third communiqué addressed U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan. Specifically, the U.S. admitted that its arm sales to Taiwan were not to be a long-term policy, they would not provide a "qualitative or quantitative" advantage, and it would gradually reduce its arms sales leading to final peaceful resolution. 15 As stated earlier, these communiqués are documented strategic communication between U.S. and PRC leaders.
However, the Taiwan Relations Act, a domestic public law set fourth in the 96 th Congress, is the backbone to U.S. policy on Taiwan.
The Taiwan Relations Act was enacted January 1, 1979, "to maintain peace, security, and stability" in the Asian theater and to preserve an unofficial relationship with the people of Taiwan. 16 The States' second primary source for imports, and its fifth primary destination for exports. The U.S.
was China's primary destination for exports, and its fifth primary source for imports behind Japan, the European Union, Taiwan, and South Korea. 24 Taiwan's major export destinations are in order the PRC, the U.S., and Japan. Its primary sources for imports are in order Japan, U.S., and PRC. 25 Regional stability and economic security qualify by definition as vital interests.
The third interest-support for a democratic partner-arguably does not qualify as a vital interest, though it is emotionally tied to U.S. moral (and for Taiwan legal) obligations to support democratic societies and to support friends and partners. 26 The second question raised by the Bush administration's policy is its interpretation of U.S. responsibilities under the TRA. Per the TRA, anything "other than peaceful" means to decide Taiwan's fate is of "grave concern to the U.S.," and Congress directs the U.S. to possess the capacity to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" that would put Taiwan at risk. 27 It is likely that an unprovoked or preemptive attack on Taiwan would be met with U.S. 48 China is equally cautious when revealing its strategic thought on its own future military competitor. Brian Bender, columnist for the Boston Globe, captures the mutual paranoia best when he cites:
In the corridors of the Pentagon and Congress, and in the secretive recesses of the People's Liberation Army in China, hard-liners in each country are highlighting the potential threat posed by the other side to enlist support for a major new buildup in conventional arms, according to diplomats and military and intelligence analysts. 49 Bender continues, citing that Chinese scholars and American defense specialists believe realists of both countries are magnifying potential conflict "to justify buying new weapons and maintaining large standing armies and navies." 50 The danger might be that by preparing for a hostile relationship with China, the Bush administration could set up a scenario for a "selffulfilling prophecy." 51 China seeks to build a defense structure that protects its homeland and its interests-and so does the U.S. 52 The Pentagon sees its role to balance military forces and protect U.S. interests in the region. 53 The obvious questions evolve: What does the U.S. fear in this build-up and when should it begin to worry?
It has been 16 years since China began its large increases in military spending, designed, as it claimed, to offset years of military neglect; however, analysts advocate a more pragmatic view-it was the genesis of a serious effort to upgrade its armed forces and apply military influence in the region. 54 credible threat to modern militaries operating in the region." 56 The report further confirms most of China's defense capability remains with older and less capable systems, however, key developments of its force modernization include;
• Extensive and proliferating short-range ballistic missiles with increased range and accuracy • New, more survivable longer-range missiles to include future road-mobile intercontinental-range ballistic missiles
• Fourth-generation Russian Su-30MKK multi-role fighters and the indigenous Su-27SK, the F-11, and the F-10 fighter aircraft • Plans for escort jammers for bombers, transports, and unmanned aerial vehicles in addition to tactical aircraft • Acquisition or development of cruise missiles and air-to-air, air-to-surface, and antiradiation missiles • Deployment of Russian-made SOVREMENNYY-class guided missile destroyers and additional KILO-class diesel electric submarines
• Production of indigenous SONG-class diesel electric submarines with advanced antiship cruise missile submerged launch capability • Employment of new YUAN-class diesel submarines and production of a next generation nuclear attack submarine
• Deployment of robust Russian air defense systems-the S-300PMU-1/SA-20 strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and the FM-90 (CSA-7) tactical SAM comparable to the French Crotale.
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In addition, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has a current ground force estimated at 375,000
that is upgrading its tanks, armored personnel carriers, and battlefield vehicles. 58 Despite U.S. fears about China's military progress, the United States is still spending more than four times more than China on defense annually, even by the most aggressive estimates on the elusive Chinese defense spending figures, causing some analysts to question U.S. response to this military threat. 67 Analysts conclude that for first part of the new century, the U.S. military has a distinct advantage over China that will not soon disappear, pointing out that it was an embroiled arms race with the United States that helped conclude an eventual economic collapse of the Soviet Union-a fate that the PRC must not follow. 68 In contrast however with China's current rate of economic expansion and with a worst case estimate of a national defense budget, China has the capability to sustain a modernization and build-up that will continue to close the gap with the U.S. military. 69 China insists it has peaceful intentions, but Pentagon assessments are convinced China will retake Taiwan by force and use its modernized military to shape the Asia-Pacific region to its liking. "China will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony." 73 The thrust of China's stated national strategy is to balance its current economic and national defense development-the two objectives are inseparable and mutually supportive. To consider policy recommendations, the U.S. must look first at its own National Security Strategy. The U.S. recognizes that its current military forces were developed from a Cold Warera construct and that these forces must now be transformed to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21 st century. 78 The NSS elaborates that the future U.S. military force won't be one required to deter massive armies as the threats have changed. However, the NSS also states, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." The most probable implication might be that if U.S.-China policies are not adapted to curtail
China's military modernization, the U.S. may be locked into a force structure race to keep the PRC in military check.
PRC Military Modernization, U.S.-China Policy Options
The next five to ten years present a window of opportunity for changes in U.S. policy with China. Prudence dictates the United States should keep a watchful eye on China's military modernization, but there are several promising options for the U.S. to do more to shape the security environment. First, to avoid a proverbial arms race and a second Cold War, the U.S.
needs to take the lead among the world powers in supporting China in its great power emergence and treat is as a peer. A China that sees itself respected, nurtured, and engaged as an equal by the U.S. would dissipate feelings of distrust and insecurity and be more willing to disclose its intentions. 85 Second, the U.S. must eliminate China's perception of strategic encirclement-its military build-up is fueled by a defense mentality to remain independently capable of protecting its sovereignty and addressing potential barriers to its economic progress. 86 The U.S. needs to fold China into an Asian-Pacific treaty organization-a NATOlike security blanket for the Asia-Pacific theater. 87 Development of this organization would do more than any other action in convincing China that heavy contributions to defense are unnecessary (indirectly it worked very well in Europe). Third, the U.S. needs to diminish the
Pentagon's open rhetoric about the future "Big One" with China. 88 China's new generation of leadership is pragmatic with global focus, a change from the ideologues of the past. 89 However, how can the U.S. national strategy "preserve the peace by building good relations among great
powers" yet indirectly propose to China a future in which the U.S. will engage it militarily?
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Based on their doctrine, China has no alternative but to prepare its defense. Finally, the U.S. To gain perspective, it might be helpful for us Americans to step back from time to time and think about our role in the world. After all, it is we who have the biggest defense budget in the world; it is we who are increasing our military spending faster than other countries. Do other countries see us as aggressive and threatening because we are building up our military? The answer is some do and some do not. Expanded defense budgets are not inherently threatening; how they are seen depends on how countries perceive each other's actions and intentions. 93 The U.S. must be the stronger leader to mitigate the PRC's military modernization and act as an example. Currently, all indications are that China is not going curtail military modernization on its own. China appears to be imitating the great power thoughts on military might-quality (late generation, high technology) versus quantity and it takes defense spending to get the advantage. The U.S. must engage China as an equal, build China's faith and confidence, and demonstrate responsible dialogue and actions if it is to convince China of a peaceful future.
Conclusion
The development and maintenance of amicable U.S.-China relationships in the next five to ten years is critical to U.S. national security and reveal significant implications to U.S. national military strategy. The predominant strategic view expressed by defense planners and other Bush administration strategists is that China will be our next near-peer military confrontation.
Adapting current U.S. policies to the conciliatory global situation early in this century might steer the U.S. away from this prophesized confrontation. With China as a strategic partner rather than as a strategic competitor, the U.S. can appropriately shape its own defense structure and organize, train, and equip a force capable of addressing the security threats of the 21 st century.
These threat are likely to be profoundly different from those posed by the great power wars of the 20 th century.
The United States appears to be changing its view-shifting its attitude from China as a strategic competitor to China as a strategic partner. 94 There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People' Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations. 
